On the other hand, Glaser[46] argues that rational actors under certain conditions might opt for cooperative policies. A hurried U.S. exit will incentivize Afghanistans various competing factions more than ever before to defect in favor of short-term gains on the assumption that one of the lead hunters in the band has given up the fight. The Stag Hunt game, derived from Rousseaus story, describes the following scenario: a group of two or more people can cooperate to hunt down the more rewarding stag or go their separate ways and hunt less rewarding hares. <>stream We can see through studying the Stag Hunt game theory that, even though we are selfish, we still are ironically aiming to for mutual benefit, and thus we tend to follow a such a social contract. [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. Additionally, the feedback, discussion, resource recommendations, and inspiring work of friends, colleagues, and mentors in several time zones especially Amy Fan, Carrick Flynn, Will Hunt, Jade Leung, Matthijs Maas, Peter McIntyre, Professor Nuno Monteiro, Gabe Rissman, Thomas Weng, Baobao Zhang, and Remco Zwetsloot were vital to this paper and are profoundly appreciated. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI . In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. [51] An analogous scenario in the context of the AI Coordination Problem could be if both international actors have developed, but not yet unleashed an ASI, where knowledge of whether the technology will be beneficial or harmful is still uncertain. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistan's internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. 0 In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? > Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. PDF The Stag Hunt - University of California, Irvine Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. [3] While (Hare, Hare) remains a Nash equilibrium, it is no longer risk dominant. If one side cooperates with and one side defects from the AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows (here we assume Actor A defects while Actor B cooperates): For the defector (here, Actor A), the benefit from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that they believe such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI times Actor As perceived benefit of receiving AI with distributional considerations [P_(b|A) (AB)b_Ad_A]. The first technology revolution caused World War I. Put another way, the development of AI under international racing dynamics could be compared to two countries racing to finish a nuclear bomb if the actual development of the bomb (and not just its use) could result in unintended, catastrophic consequences. Carol M. Rose argues that the stag hunt theory is useful in 'law and humanities' theory. In Exercises 252525 through 323232, f(x)f(x)f(x) is a probability density function for a particular random variable XXX. There are three levels - the man, the structure of the state and the international system. Learn how and when to remove these template messages, Learn how and when to remove this template message, "Uses of Game Theory in International Relations", "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt", "Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources", https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stag_hunt&oldid=1137589086, Articles that may contain original research from November 2018, All articles that may contain original research, Articles needing additional references from November 2018, All articles needing additional references, Wikipedia articles that are too technical from July 2018, Articles with multiple maintenance issues, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 12:51. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. As a result, this could reduce a rival actors perceived relative benefits gained from developing AI. 0 Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. Table 2. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. [28] Once this Pandoras Box is opened, it will be difficult to close. But what is even more interesting (even despairing) is, when the situation is more localized and with a smaller network of acquainted people, most players still choose to hunt the hare as opposed to working together to hunt the stag. In short, the theory suggests that the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). Here, values are measured in utility. [11] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier, June 2017, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx: 5 (estimating major tech companies in 2016 spent $20-30 billion on AI development and acquisitions). Depending on the payoff structures, we can anticipate different likelihoods of and preferences for cooperation or defection on the part of the actors. Here, I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. Often, games with a similar structure but without a risk dominant Nash equilibrium are called assurance games. Table 4. For example, suppose we have a prisoner's dilemma as pictured in Figure 3. Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. For example, Jervis highlights the distinguishability of offensive-defensive postures as a factor in stability. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. About: Stag hunt the 'inherent' right to individual and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and enforcement measures involving the use of force sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter VII thereof. The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? However, if one doesn't, the other wastes his effort. In biology many circumstances that have been described as prisoner's dilemma might also be interpreted as a stag hunt, depending on how fitness is calculated. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. startxref Photo Credit: NATO photo by Capt. It sends a message to the countrys fractious elites that the rewards for cooperation remain far richer than those that would come from going it alone. [20] Will Knight, Could AI Solve the Worlds Biggest Problems? MIT Technology Review, January 12, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545416/could-ai-solve-the-worlds-biggest-problems/. Together, this is expressed as: One last consideration to take into account is the relationship between the probabilities of developing a harmful AI for each of these scenarios. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. Because of its capacity to radically affect military and intelligence systems, AI research becomes an important consideration in national security and would unlikely be ignored by political and military leaders. In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. In the event that both actors are in a Stag Hunt, all efforts should be made to pursue negotiations and persuade rivals of peaceful intent before the window of opportunity closes. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. Civilians and civilian objects are protected under the laws of armed conflict by the principle of distinction. For example, international sanctions involve cooperation against target countries (Martin, 1992a; Drezner, . This subsection looks at the four predominant models that describe the situation two international actors might find themselves in when considering cooperation in developing AI, where research and development is costly and its outcome is uncertain. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. (lljhrpc). (required), 2023 Cornell University Powered by Edublogs Campus and running on blogs.cornell.edu, The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. It is also the case that some human interactions that seem like prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be stag hunts. Weiss, Uri, and Joseph Agassi. This essay first appeared in the Acheson Prize 2018 Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream Robert J Aumann, "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing," in Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation (Essays in Honor of Jacques Dreze), edited by J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. This can be facilitated, for example, by a state leader publicly and dramatically expressing understanding of danger and willingness to negotiate with other states to achieve this. This makes the risk twofold; the risk that the stag does not appear, and the risk that another hunter takes the kill. This is expressed in the following way: The intuition behind this is laid out in Armstrong et al.s Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence.[55] The authors suggest each actor would be incentivized to skimp on safety precautions in order to attain the transformative and powerful benefits of AI before an opponent. This table contains a representation of a payoff matrix. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. But for the argument to be effective against a fool, he must believe that the others with whom he interacts are notAlwaysfools.Defect.
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